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Abstract:  Derivative markets have exploded over the last decade, remained active in the midst 
of the 2007-2009 financial crises and continue to be dominated by a small group of bank holding 
companies (BHC). BHC motives for derivative usage are usually tied to hedging purposes 
(balance sheet risk management), trading purposes (profit motives) or some combination thereof. 
This paper examines the relationship between derivative trading income and bank charter value 
for 27 BHC between 2001Q1-2011Q3. We find that the impact of derivative trading income on 
bank charter value, using Tobin’s Q, is very small and seems to be tied to BHCs derivatives 
dealer trading designation. We also find that trading incomes are a modest fraction of net 
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Trading Income and Bank Charter Value during the Financial Crisis:  




In the banking industry, managers are tasked with a dual objective of managing the 
various sources of risk inherent in their business while maximizing shareholder value. 
Bank managers must balance between these objectives since increases in shareholder 
returns usually come at a cost of increased risk. Over the last few decades, we have 
witnessed rising popularity in the bank use of derivatives to manage various forms of risk 
they are exposed to including interest rate, foreign exchange and credit risk. A derivatives 
security is commonly defined as a financial security whose payoff is tied to (or derived 
from) a previously issued security. Derivative securities (e.g. swaps, futures, forwards, 
option contracts, among others) generally involves an agreement between two parties to 
exchange a standard quantity of an asset or cash flow at a predetermined price and an 
agreed upon future date. Thus, derivatives involve the buying and selling, or transfer of 
risk.   
According to Sinkey and Carter (2000), banks participate in the derivatives market as 
dealers, end users or both. They also state that as end users, banks can use derivatives 
either to hedge against unexpected changes interest rates, foreign exchange rates, or 
commodity prices or to speculate on the future movement of these economic variables. 
These authors also note that only the largest banks act as dealers by providing over- the- 
counter (OTC) derivative products to nonfinancial firms and other banks. It is also well 
documented that derivative activities are centered in a handful of large banks. Per the 
2011Q4 bank trading and derivatives activities report prepared by Office the Comptroller 
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of the Currency (OCC), there are five large commercial banks  that account for  96% of 
all banking industry notional amounts of derivatives while 99% of the total is held by the 
top 25  banks. The industry concentration among the dealer banks as measured by the 
Herfindahl Index had remained well above the 30% level between 2001Q4 and 2008Q4, 
and since 2011Q4 has settled modestly below the 25% level as seen in Figure 1. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that higher levels of industry concentration allow for 
monopolist behavior which is a source of market power that may favorably impact a 
bank’s charter value. 
The potential for significant fee income generation has led banks to participate in 
derivative markets to offer risk management services to its corporate clients. This trend 
has grown over the last few decades with fees incomes representing an important revenue 
source to help offset flat to declining spreads earned on traditional lending business. It is 
clear that a select group of large banks, namely those that focus on derivative activities, 
earn far more fee income than those banks that are not set up to participate in the 
derivatives market. It is also known that dealing and trading in derivative products 
through a bank profit center requires substantial investment in financial, human, 
intellectual and reputational capital. The substantial required capital investment poses a   
barrier to entry into the derivative market making activity for the smaller banks 
 Some researchers claim that off-balance-activities, including derivatives trading, 
have become a potential source of bank charter value for the large banks (e.g. Furlong 
and Kwan, 2006).  Derivative trading not only generates important fee income to the 
banks but provides opportunities for bankers to add value through cross-selling 
opportunities and enhanced customer relationships. Based on the implied negative 
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relationship between risk and charter value, derivative activities used for hedging 
purposes should favorably impact bank charter value. Prior to the financial crisis, 
Brunnermeier et al. (2012) state that banks have increasingly earned a higher proportion 
of their profits from non-interest income (including income from derivatives trading) 
compared to interest income. Therefore, it would seem interesting to explore the linkage 
between derivative dealer bank behavior and charter value. The term charter value is 
broadly defined as the expected present value of a firm’s economic rents. In a banking 
context, Palia and Porter (2004) refer to charter value as the present value of the bank’s 
future economic profits as a going concern. The bank’s profit potential in turn is highly 
linked to customer relationships, efficiency and market power. Through the issuance of 
an approved bank charter, banks have the ability to operate in a regulatory environment 
that may curtail external competition from non-bank sources. Banking legislation that 
curbs such competition from non-bank sources provides market power to approved banks 
thereby creating value. 
The continued evolution in derivative securities, and the significant trading losses 
recorded during the 2007-2009 financial crises, has drawn attention to bank regulators, 
law makers and the investor public. For our sample of 27 bank holding companies 
(BHC), aggregate trading losses from 2007Q3 to 2008Q4 totaled U.S. $73.6 billion
1
. The 
collapse of the largest investment banks who were the market makers of traded securities, 
the originators of new securities, and producers of derivative products also placed the 
                                                     
1
 The quarterly trading losses reported during the crisis period by our sample BHCs are in sharp contrast with the 
cumulative trading incomes reported during the rise of the housing boom period. From 2003Q3-2004Q4, cumulative 
trading incomes for our BHC sample totaled U.S. $50.1billion. Over the full sample period, aggregate trading 
incomes were reported in 37 of the 43 quarters resulting in U.S. $506.9 billion in cumulative trading income. More 
recently, the WSJ May 11, 2012 article “J.P. Morgan’s $2 Billion Blunder” by Fitzpatrick, Zuckerman and 
Rappaport reported on the large trading losses posted by the bank during 2012Q2 resulting from bad investment 
decisions made on credit default swaps (CDS) by the bank’s risk management group. 
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derivative markets in the spotlight. The severity of bank losses reported during the 2007-
2009 financial crisis, including losses from proprietary trading that involved derivative 
activities, ultimately led to the Dodd Frank Act of 2010 that contains the Volker Rule. 
From a broad perspective, the attention to the use of derivatives by banks is further 
attributed to the dramatic increase in the gross notional value of derivatives that far 
exceed the increase in BHC assets as depicted in Figure 2.  It is important to examine the 
large dealer banks since Brunnermeier et al. (2012) point out that systemic risk is higher 
for banks with higher non-interest income
2
 to interest income ratios, a condition that is 
common with large dealer banks. They suggest that activities that are not traditionally 
linked with banks such as deposit taking and lending are associated with a larger 
contribution to systemic risk.    
This study investigates the following research questions: 1) Does trading income 
contribute to BHC charter value? 2) Does derivatives dealer designation change the 
impact of trading incomes on BHC charter value? and 3) Did trading incomes help  
support BHC net operating revenues during the 2007-2009 financial crises? This research 
is important since substantial derivative exposure with respect to BHC assets and capital 
can lead to disruptive consequences in the event of unfavorable market movements or 
increases in counterparty risk. Failure by a large complex financial institution, such as 
those included in our sample, may produce spillover effects across the financial system 
which could lead to negative repercussions on the economy and the business community. 
The timeliness of the research is appropriate given the fragility of the U.S. economy that 
                                                     
2
 Brunnermeier et al. (2012) decompose non-interest income into two components: 1) trading income and 2) 
investment banking and venture capital income. They find that both components are approximately equally related 
to systemic risk. They also find that banks with higher trading income one-year prior to the recession earned lower 
returns during the recession period and that no such significant effect was found for the investment banking and 
venture capital income variable. 
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is currently showing weak signs of mild recovery. This research is also germane to bank 
regulators who examine and monitor the complex relationships between the degree of 
BHC market power, cost and profit efficiency measures and overall bank stability. An 
improved understanding of the connection between derivative activity and BHC charter 
value expands market based discipline measures used by uninsured depositors and 
investors to punish (or reward) banks for excessive (or prudent) risk taking activities. 
This study contributes to the literature in the following interesting way. First, we do 
not identify any published study that explicitly examines the contribution of trading 
income to BHC charter value. This issue is important given the accelerated growth in 
derivative activity during the first decade in the new millennium and the volatility that 
trading incomes exhibit over our sample period as shown in Figure 3 while 
acknowledging that the bulk of such incomes are predominately generated by dealer 
banks. This study attempts to bridge the gap in the current literature on charter value and 
derivative activity. Second, we examine data from 2001Q1 to 2011Q3 that covers periods 
of economic expansion (including the build up of the housing bubble) and the subsequent 
bust. We also cover a greater time span of the latest U.S. financial crisis. The sample time 
frame covers changes in economic climate and periods of significant derivative usage that 
should allow for improved inferences to be made on the effects of derivative usage on 
BHC charter value. Lastly, this study contributes to the body of literature that suggests 
that derivative activity is driven by profit as opposed to hedging motives. This study 
implies that BHCs increase risk through their off-balance sheet activities that generate 
volatile trading revenues. Any contribution of trading revenues to BHC charter value is 
suspect at best due to their volatility and given the fact that they account for such a small 
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fraction of BHC’s net operating revenues. 
The primary finding of this study is that trading income has a negative impact on 
BHC charter value yet the impact becomes positive when trading income is interacted 
with derivative dealer designation. Trading income’s contribution to BHC charter value is 
damped by the fact that trading income is only a small fraction of BHCs’ net operating 
revenue and is highly volatile. Finally, we observe that trading income did not contribute 
to overall BHC income during the financial crisis. 
 This study is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review and 
includes some discussion on bank charter value.  Section 3 puts forth research 
hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and defines the variables used in the study. 
Section 5 introduces the methodology and Section 6 discusses the results, followed by the 
conclusion. 
2. Literature Review  
 
      2.1 Derivative Literature 
The latest derivative literature seems to be motivated by the impetus, and product innovation, 
in derivative markets over the last few decades and more recently by the episodes of large 
trading losses, including those generated during the latest U.S. financial crisis. These events have 
heightened public investors’ interest regarding the role of banking institutions in derivative 
markets (see Purnanandam (2007), Ashraf et al. (2007) Minton et al. (2009), Zhao and Moser 
(2009) and Li & Yu (2010), among others). There is an ongoing debate regarding the impact of 
derivative usage on bank’s risk. Purnanandam (2007) jointly model bank failure probability and 
hedging decisions using a two stage estimation technique that is applied to data on U.S. 
commercial banks from 1997Q4 through 2003Q3. This author’s findings are in line with hedging 
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theories in that banks with higher probabilities of financial distress manage their interest rate 
risks more aggressively through on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet instruments. Zhao and 
Moser (2009) simultaneously model two alternative methods of interest rate risk management 
(i.e. maturity gap analysis and interest rate derivative usage) on a sample of publicly traded BHC 
during 1998-2003. They conclude that BHCs employ gap analysis to manage exposure to 
changes in short term interest rates and use derivatives to manage residual rate exposures 
resulting from changes in the slope of the term structure of interest rates. Their results support 
the view that interest rate derivative usage has risk reducing effects. During the 2007-2009 
financial crises, Duffie (2010) explains that dealer banks are exposed to new forms of bank runs 
and describes the mechanics by which dealer banks can fail which include: (i) the flight of 
prime-brokerage clients, (ii) the loss of short-term secured credit, (iii) defensive reactions of 
derivatives counterparties and (iv) loss of cash and securities settlement privileges at clearing 
banks.  
The derivative literature has been extended in recent years to investigate credit derivatives 
that according to some observers are claimed to be a revolutionary financial innovation that 
allows banks to manage credit risk apart from other forms of financial risk such as interest rate 
and exchange rate risks. Using annual data from 1997 through 2004 on a sample of 346 BHCs in 
the U.S., Ashraf et al. (2007) find that the participation in credit derivative markets is closely 
related to bank size whereas there is limited evidence that entry barriers related to franchise 
value or prior experience in derivative markets are important. Examining credit derivative 
activities by large U.S. bank holding companies (BHC) from 1999-2005, Minton et al. (2009) 
find that only a small fraction use credit derivatives and that most of their positions are held for 
dealer activities rather than for loan hedging purposes. A theoretical paper by Instefjord (2005) 
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that focuses on risk and hedging through credit derivatives using a model based on costs of 
financial distress proposes two effects of credit derivatives innovation. The author concludes that 
credit derivatives enhance risk sharing that supports a hedging argument. However, the author 
also suggests that credit derivatives make further acquisition of risk more attractive. The 
implication is that if the second effect dominates the first, then credit derivative activity could 
destabilize the banking sector.   
Derivatives markets dealing with foreign currency claims and the expanded scope of 
derivative activities into international markets have also been also been subject of research.  For 
example, Chaudhry et al. (2000) investigates the relationship between market based risk 
measures and foreign currency claims using a three factor model on a sample of 112 U.S. 
publicly traded BHC’s using data from 1989 through 1993.  The results suggest that options tend 
to increase bank risk, swaps are used mainly for hedging purposes, and that forward contracts 
and currency commitments have only a minor impact on bank risk. The work of Chaudhry et al. 
(2000) was extended to an international setting by Reichert and Shyu (2003). These authors 
using multifactor index models and applying VaR analysis on bank equity find similar results to 
those reported by of Chaudhry et al. (2000). The results in Reichert and Shyu (2003) are the 
strongest and most consistent for the sample of U.S. dealer banks. Weaker results were obtained 
for the European banks and the Japanese banks, respectively. 
  In sum, the relevant literature deals mostly with how derivative usage impacts bank risk and 
examines the underlying motives for derivative activity- i.e. end users (mainly for hedging 
purposes) vs. dealers (profit driven market making). The research does not offer clear answers as 
to which of these two underlying motives is most likely to prevail. Furthermore, little attention 
has been given to the effects of derivative usage on bank revenue and or on bank performance. 
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We find one example in Li & Yu (2010). These authors examine the impact of derivative usage 
on bank performance, proxied by return on assets (ROA), and on BHC risk, captured through the 
asset volatility. Applying panel data techniques to a sample of 18 large U.S. BHC between 
2005Q2 and 2008Q3, these authors find that derivative activities increased BHC overall risk 
level since BHCs were able to take on more speculative positions in derivative contracts. These 
authors also find that speculative derivative positions were eventually rolled down after the sub-
prime mortgage loan crisis.  
     2.2 Bank Charter Value 
     Charter value has commonly been defined in terms of a bank’s future economic profits, 
generated as a going concern, that are discounted at a market required rate of return. Banks, for 
example, are able to earn economic profits by attracting funds at below-market rates (e.g. FDIC 
insured demand deposits) or setting loan yields at above market rates. Under these conditions 
that suggest a form of pricing power, bank’s assets (liabilities) may be valued at above (below) 
their respective book values. Historically, U.S. banks derived charter value from market power 
awarded to them through government regulations that curbed interbank and nonbank firm 
competition i.e. geographic and product based sources of market power.   The literature has put 
forth other banking activities outside of traditional lending and deposit taking functions that 
potentially impact charter value. One such potential source comes from off-balance sheet 
activities, which is the subject of our study.  Finally the literature suggests that improved bank 
operational efficiencies and changes in business cycle conditions may also influence bank charter 
value - see Furlong and Kwan (2006).  
     Jones et al. (2011) explains that although charter value may not be directly observed, theory 
suggest that Tobin’s Q should be a useful proxy. These authors also formulate the relationship 
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between Tobin’s Q and charter value in the following fashion. For publicly traded banks, Tobin’s 
Q is defined as the market value of the bank’s assets (i.e. market value of bank equity plus its 
debt) divided by the replacement cost of the bank’s assets.  Therefore, Tobin’s Q may be 
expresses as: 
         
       
   
                     (1) 
Where MVE is the market value of equity, BVL is the book value of liabilities and BVA is the 
book value of assets.  It is noted that if all assets and liabilities were recorded at their historical 
cost and if the markets consistently valued banks correctly, then the relationship between market 
value of equity, book value of equity and charter value could be expresses as: 
           where CV represents the bank’s charter value.                         (2)  
The market value of equity MVE by definition is the present value of the banks expected income 
stream discounted by the risk-adjusted rate of return required by the market rm.  The expected 
income stream for Bank i can be separated into two components: expected normal profits NP and 
expected economic profits EP. On this basis, the market value of bank equity may be written as: 
      
         
       
 
                                                                                                            (3) 
 In a perfectly competitive economy, all profits are competed away so that the existing 
shareholders earn just the required market rate of return on their capital that they supply to the 
bank. On this basis, Jones et al. (2011) suggests that the discounted stream of normal profits NP, 
which are those earned in a perfectly competitive economy, will equal the book value of equity 
since the market values of perfectly competitive financial assets and liabilities will equal their 
respective book values. In the case where a bank can earn above-normal profits (i.e. expected 
economic profits) on its capital, the present value of the future stream of cash flows will accrue 
to the benefit of the stockholders.  Under this condition, assets and or (liabilities) are valued by 
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the market above (below) their respective book values and the stream of economic profits 
discounted at the required market rate of return will equal the bank’s charter value. By 
substituting equation 2 into equation 1 we come up with the following equation: 
         
          
   
   
  
   
                                     (4) 
Equation 4 shows us the relationship between Tobin’s Q and charter value. We note that Tobin’s 
Q is a scaled measure of charter value. As pointed out by Jones et al. (2011), the Tobin’s Q 
measure can be a misleading measure of charter value if the market fails to properly value the 
bank. For example, market misalignments with respect to fundamental values usually occur 
during periods of stock market bubbles or stock market crashes. If the market fails to sufficiently 
discount assets for risk (in part due to the opaque nature of banks), then Tobin’s Q increases 
while the high-risk assets earn substantial profits. However, Tobin’s Q falls sharply once the risk 
becomes apparent and the market valuation of assets decline accordingly. 
3. Research Hypotheses 
 This paper introduces two testable hypotheses dealing with the impact of trading incomes on 
bank charter value. Furlong and Kwan (2006) find that, with the exception of the very largest 
BHC, the market is less confident about the reliance on activities generating non-interest income, 
including derivatives trading, relative to other banking activities. Furthermore, while trading 
incomes on balance have been positive over our sample period 2001Q1-2011Q3, they represent 
only a modest fraction of net operating incomes, are highly volatile and did not contribute to 
overall BHC income during the crisis. According to Stiroh (2004), high volatility in trading 
incomes led banks to undertake higher risk that resulted in lower risk-adjusted profits. We also 
accept from Jones et al. (2011) that there is an implied negative relationship between risk and 
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charter value. On this basis, trading incomes would not appear to be a contributing factor to bank 
charter value. This rationalization leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1: There is an inverse relationship between trading derivative incomes scaled by the sum of 
net interest and non-interest income and bank charter value.  
 It is well documented that most derivative market making activity is generated by a few large 
BCHs that dominate the market. Furlong and Kwan (2006) further note that the mix of activities 
that generate non-interest income differs based on BHC size and that for the larger BHCs the mix 
of income is weighted towards market making derivatives activities. The concentration in 
derivative activity among few large BCHs has been explained by the requirements of substantial 
investment in financial, human and intellectual capital that along with advance internal controls 
and favorable trading reputation are necessary to deal in derivative markets. Furthermore, since it 
is plausible that charter value is related to industry concentration and that industry concentration 
is greater for dealer banks compared to smaller commercial banks in general, we would expect 
that trading by dealer banks may have a positive impact on bank charter value. To the extent that 
trading incomes are associated with trading exposures taken by BHC that are providing dealer 
(marking-making) services to customers, trading exposures do not add to BHC risk. On the other 
hand, proprietary trading by BHC would introduce an element of risk.  The large dealer banks 
that engage in proprietary trading typically have access to a broader scope of funding sources 
and usually exhibit favorable capitalization characteristics, compared to their medium and small 
counterparts that allow the large dealer banks to afford higher risk. We suggest that the largest 
dealer banks can benefit from trading activity. This leads to the second hypothesis: 
H2: There is a direct relationship between trading derivative incomes by dealer banks scaled 




      4.1 Sample and Sources 
       
         To develop our sample in the first stage we search the list of the top 50 bank 
holding companies (BHC) as of 2011Q3 as reported by the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council (FFIEC).  Privately held BHCs are excluded from the final sample 
since our analysis includes a Tobin’s Q measure that uses stock price data. We also 
exclude from our sample those companies that have marginal, if any, focus on traditional 
banking activities (i.e. insurance companies, credit card companies, pure investment 
banks).To be included in the final sample, we require that the companies have some level 
of derivative activity. Applying the above sample selection criteria we identify 18 BHCs 
for our study. In an effort to expand the sample size, in the final stage we relax our 
selection criteria only to the extent that BHCs are no longer required to be included in the 
list of the top 50 BHC which allows to consider smaller BHCs in terms of asset size and 
derivative exposure which brings us to our final sample of 27 BHCs.  We collect balance 
sheet, income statement and derivative data for 27 bank holding companies (BHC) over 
the sample time period 2001Q1 to 2011Q3
3
. Given the focus of this study and the high 
concentration of derivative usage by a small group of large BHCs as confirmed by our 
Herfindahl index measure that is graphed in Figure 1, we believe that we have an 
adequate representative sample that includes a good mix of BHC based on asset size, 
structure, business activities and business scope
4
. A visual inspection of Figure 2 that 
                                                     
3
  Although data is available prior to 2001Q1 which would expand the time horizon of this study, we believe that the 
time frame we chose is adequate since it covers periods of economic expansion (including the buildup of the 
housing bubble), the subsequent bust and a full time span of the latest U.S financial crisis. The time span in this 
study covers interesting trends in derivative market industry concentration that over the entire time period remains 
high (see Figure 1).  
4
  The sample includes 3 of the top 5 derivatives users that collectively account for 96% of the total banking industry 
notional value of derivatives per the 2011Q3 OCCs bank trading and derivatives activity report. Roughly half of the 
15 
 
presents an overlay of our sample that covers the period from 2001Q1 to 2011Q3 against 
the entire population of financial institutions that engaged in derivative activity between 
1998Q4 to 2012Q4 also seems to support our sample selection. We reach a similar 
conclusion regarding the representative nature of our sample when we inspect Figure 3 
that depicts the trading revenues (scaled by the sum of non-interest income and net 
interest income) for the banks in our sample, and Figure 4 that depicts those (unscaled) 
for insured U.S. commercial banks, with the latter covering a longer time span from 
1997Q1 to 2012Q4
5
. Appendix A contains the list of BHCs used in this study and the 
respective total assets and total notional value of derivatives for each BHC as of the end 
of sample period. The bank holding company information is extracted from Consolidated 
Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (call report form FR Y-9C) that are 
submitted on a quarterly basis to the Federal Reserve. The data from call reports that 
BHCs file are available through the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago data base at the 
following website https://www.chicagofed.org/applications/bhc_data/bhcdata_index.cfm 
last accessed on 9/20/12. The BHC balance information used in this study includes total 
assets, total loans, real estate loans, total liabilities, various deposit measures (e.g. interest 
bearing and non-interest bearing deposits, money market savings accounts and small time 
deposits < $100,000) and a Tier 1 risk based capital ratio. The BHC income statement 
information consists of net interest income, non-interest income, total non interest 
expense, and trading revenue. The derivative information measures the gross notional 
value of derivatives broken down by contract type (i.e. interest rates, foreign exchange, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
BHCs in the sample are identified on the list of the top 25 BHCs engaged in derivative activities per the previously 
referenced derivatives activity OCC report.  
5
 Following the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, in Figure 3 the trading revenue series (which are scaled by 
the sum of net interest income and non-interest income) represent an asset weighted mean to control for the wide 
dispersion that exists at the right tail of the bank-size distribution. We thank the reviewer for this suggestion. 
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commodities and equities) and by purpose (i.e. derivatives held for trading vs. non-
trading). Appendix B contains a list of the BHC variables used in this study and their 
respective code names as identified in the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago data base. 
      4.2 Descriptives  
 
Table 1 panels A through C provides summary descriptive information on BHC 
variables for the full sample and subsamples of BHCs based on derivatives dealer 
designation. Following Sinkey and Carter (2000), we classify those BHCs that are 
members of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) as dealers. 
These authors assert that dealer banks are not only involved as end users of derivatives 
but are also heavily active as dealers of over-the-counter (OTC) derivative products
6
.   
Panel A suggests that we have a good mix of BHCs in our sample in terms of asset 
size, albeit with some skewness,  with a  mean  (median) of  U.S. $260.6 billion (U.S. 
$64.7 billion) ranging in size from a low of U.S $6.2 billion to  a high of U.S. $2.370 
trillion over the entire sample period. Trading derivatives, scaled by assets, seem to play 
a larger role in BHC activities compared to non-traded derivatives as the mean of scaled 
trading derivatives is roughly sixteen times larger than the mean of scaled non-traded 
derivatives. However, it is noted that trading derivatives exhibits greater volatility 
contrasted with the non-traded derivatives as seen in the large differences in standard 
deviations between these two asset classes (i.e. 875.94% versus 27.15%). Trading 
derivative income is also volatile, based on reported standard deviation of 6.07%, and 
represents only a modest fraction of BHC net operating revenues over the sample period 
as seen by the mean and (median) values of 3.09% (1.32%) respectively. On an operating 
                                                     
6
  The sample includes 8 derivative dealers that are identified through the ISDA. They are: JP Morgan Chase & Co, 
Bank of America Corporation, Citigroup, Wellsfargo & Co., State Street Corporation, Regions Financial Corp, PNC 
Financial Services Group Inc and Key Corp. 
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basis, the BHC in the sample appear profitable, on average, over the sample period as 
measured by the mean (median) net-interest income values scaled by total average assets 
of 1.90% (1.75%) respectively. Real estate portfolios and core deposits are important 
components of BHC balance sheets with reported mean values, scaled by total assets, 
similar to those documented in related empirical studies that examine bank charter value 
(e.g. Jones et al., 2011; Furlong and Kwan, 2006). 
 The stark contrast between derivative dealers and non-dealers on several 
characteristics is reflected in Panels B and C of Table 1. Even though there are marked 
differences in terms of asset size between both groups, they exhibit similar attributes in 
terms of net interest income and overall operating efficiency. While trading derivatives 
and the related derivative incomes are greater for the derivative dealers compared to their 
counterparts, the variability on both measures is smaller for the derivative dealers given 
the respective coefficients of variation of 1.28 and 1.69 versus 1.94 and 2.08 respectively. 
Dealer banks have reduced reliance on core deposits for funding purposes, greater 
exposure on non-traded derivatives and smaller real estate loan exposures compared to 
non-dealer banks. 
Table 2 reflects summary data on the quarterly growth rate of assets, trading income 
and derivatives for the full sample (Panel A) and the two bank groups (Panel B- 
Derivative Dealer and Panel C- Non Dealers). To control for firm dynamics, particularly 
resulting from mergers and acquisitions, we exclude bank-quarter data with asset growth 
over the preceding quarter in excess of 50%. Due to the potential impact that mergers and 
acquisitions may have on derivative activities, we also adjust trading income and trading 
derivative bank-quarter data accordingly. Over the sample period 2001Q1 to 2011Q3, 
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asset growth was slightly higher on average for the dealer banks compared to the non-
dealer banks while the former also exhibited greater growth and lower volatility from 
trading incomes compared to the non-dealer banks. Table 2 also shows that while non-
dealer banks had higher growth in trading derivatives compared to the dealer banks they 
also experienced greater variability. As of the end of sample period 2011Q3, both bank 
groups, in spite of there vast size difference, exhibited strong capitalization slightly in 
favor of the dealer banks (average Tier 1 capital ratio of 13.206 vs. 12.919). 
 Table 3 shows contemporaneous bivariate correlations for the independent variables 
included in the model. With the exception of the correlations between trading derivatives 
and dealer designation with BHC total assets, all other correlations are either small or 
modest. The significant correlation between trading derivatives and dealer designation 
with BHC total assets is not surprising since dealers hold the largest trading derivative 
portfolios and are typically the largest banks. The small to modest correlations reported in 
Table 3 help mitigate any potential collinearity issues that could impact the model. 
5. Methodology 
Given the cross-sectional and time series dimensions of the bank sample data, we 
employ a panel data fixed-effects estimator to examine the effect of trading income and 
dealer designation on bank charter value proxied by Tobin’s Q.  The advantage of the 
fixed-effects estimation is that it allows for the cross-sectional units’ (individual banks) 
time invariant unobserved effects to be correlated with the explanatory variables. While 
we are dealing with a relatively small bank sample, we believe that there are sufficient 
differences between the banks in terms of size and scope that would prevent us from 





  as the primary variable of interest along with various bank control variables 
commonly used in the charter value literature (cf. Keeley, 1990; De Nicolo, 2001; Jones 
et al., 2011; Furlong and Kwan, 2006).  
The BHC total asset variable controls for the effect of size on Tobin’s Q and  to 
control for  the potential that the relative option value of the federal deposit insurance 
safety net increases with bank size as suggested by Furlong and Kwan (2006). In general, 
higher charter values are associated with BHCs that exhibit higher capital ratios under the 
so-called charter value hypothesis however larger BHCs tend to have lower capital ratios 
compared to smaller BHCs. As charter value begins to decline, the incentive increases for 
a BHC to take on added risk and abuse the deposit insurance option. On this basis, we 
expect a negative relationship between assets and charter value. 
 The net interest income and core deposits variables are well known proxies of market 
power that are widely used in bank charter value modeling. On this basis, we would 
expect that the market power derived from the aforementioned operating measures (i.e. 
net interest income and core deposits) is directly related to Tobin’s Q. The inclusion of a 
loan variable is common in the bank charter value literature given that banks expect to 
earn rents from their lending activities and thus we expect a positive relationship between 
our loan variable and Tobin’s Q. In most cases, real estate loans tend to account for the 
bulk of bank’s total lending portfolio, which explains why we choose this lending 
variable in our specifications. Support for the efficiency variable is found in empirical 
                                                     
7
 Trading income captures the net gain or loss from trading cash instruments, off-balance sheet derivative contracts 
and sales of assets and other financial instruments. This line item also includes revaluations to carrying values of 
trading assets and liabilities resulting from marking to market adjustments as well as revaluations related to marking 
to market adjustments of interest rate, foreign exchange, equity, and commodity derivative contracts held for trading 




studies by Berger (2003), Furlong and Kwan (2006) and Turk-Ariss (2010). Efficiency 
can be viewed as a potential source of bank charter value in light of emerging 
technologies in processing information and managing risk. Berger (2003) explains that 
given the information based nature of the banking industry, banks are responsive to 
technology investments that permit them to reduce costs of back room operations and to 
facilitate innovations in financial products and delivery systems. Since an increase in our 
efficiency variable by construction suggests a higher degree of inefficiency, we expect a 
negative relationship between efficiency and Tobin’s Q. We include non-traded and 
trading derivatives in the model since these instruments are used for hedging purposes 
(balance sheet risk management), trading purposes (profit motive) or some combination 
thereof. To the extent that derivatives reduce balance risk and represent a monopoly 
source of income we would expect that derivatives would exert a positive impact on 
charter value as proxied by Tobin’s Q. The notional value of market related derivatives 
may proxy as a continuing stream of future cash flows that a BHC might earn from 
related fees. 
Previous studies have also found that macro-economic conditions influence bank 
charter value (cf. Keeley, 1990; Furlong and Kwan, 2006; Jones et al., 2011). Common to 
all BHCs, the macro-economic indicators included in this study are the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) percentage gap, the S&P 500 inflation adjusted returns on the index and 
the 3-month U.S. Treasury bill rate. The GDP variable controls for the state of the 
business cycle while the S&P 500 inflation adjusted index returns controls for changes in 
the condition of capital markets. Beforehand, we expect positive relationships between 
our GDP variable and the S&P variable with Tobin’s Q since it is well documented that 
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business cycle conditions and overall stock market conditions seem to be directly 
correlated with Tobin’s Q.  The interest rate variable controls for the changes in rate 
environments that impact BHC net asset spreads. Since a rise in interest rates generally 
leads to a greater decline in the market value of BHC assets over liabilities, when asset 
duration is greater, we expect a negative relationship between the interest rate variable 
and Tobin’s Q.   
To investigate the effect of trading income and dealer designation on bank charter 
value proxied by Tobin’s Q we present the following empirical model: 
 
                                                                    (5)  
 
where Tobin’s Q is computed as the quarterly ratio of the sum of the market value of 
equity plus the book value of total liabilities to BHC total assets; with bk consisting of a 
vector of bank variables that include the log of BHC total assets along with net interest 
income, trading and non-trading derivatives, real estate loans and core deposits all scaled 
by BHC total assets and an efficiency variable measured as the ratio of BHC overhead to  
the sum of net interest and non-interest income; trading derivative income scaled by the 
sum of  net interest and non-interest income
8
 which is our primary variable of interest, 
and macro which is a vector of macro variables that include GDP percentage gap, S&P 
500 inflation adjusted index returns and the 3-month U.S. Treasury bill rate. To avoid 
spurious regression results, the GDP gap, U.S.Treasury bill rate, real estate loans and core 
                                                     
8
 While acknowledging that non-interest income can be decomposed into two components: 1) trading income and 2) 
investment banking and venture capital income as employed by Brunnermeier et al. (2012), given the emphasis of 
derivative activity in our study we choose to focus on trading income in our model of BHC charter value proxied by 
Tobin’s Q noting that non-interest income is used in our model to scale the efficiency and trading income variables. 
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deposits variables enter the model in first difference
9
.  
     With this specification, we can test both research hypotheses. Specifically, if β2 is 
significantly negative, it supports Hypothesis 1 that there is an inverse relationship 
between trading derivative incomes and bank charter value. On the other hand, if β2 is 
significantly positive when interacted with the dealer indicator variable, it supports 
Hypothesis 2 that there is a direct relationship between trading derivative incomes by 
dealer banks sand bank charter value.  
     The model bears resemblance to the specification used by Jones et al. (2011) and Li 
and Yu (2010) with some unique differences.  First, we introduce the trading income 
variable, our main variable of interest, that is absent in the specification by Jones et al. 
(2011). Although the trading income is controlled for in Li and Yu (2010), they focus on 
examining the impact of derivatives on bank performance, in terms of return on assets 
(ROA), and volatility in asset values using stock price volatility and option pricing 
modeling. Second, we control for derivatives dealer designation to explore behavior 
differences within our sample and the effects on charter value, proxied by Tobin’s Q. 
Third, we incorporate trading and non-trading derivatives in our model which are omitted 
from Jones et al. (2011) specification while Li and Yu’s (2010) control for only non-
traded derivatives in their model. By including trading and non-trading derivatives in the 
model we set out to capture the full impact of derivative usage on charter value 
acknowledging that there may be differences in the underlying motivation for their use 
(i.e. balance sheet risk management vs. profit motives).  
                                                     
9
  We apply the Im-Pesaran-Shin’s (2003) unit root test designed for panel data to all the model variables. The null 
of the test is that all panels contain unit roots. We conclude that with  the exception of the real estate loans, core 
deposits, GDP gap and 3 month U.S. Treasury bill rate variables, at least one series in the panel is stationary. Unit 
root test tables are not reported in this study but are available upon request. 
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     We expand the benchmark model to incorporate two additional specifications. First, 
we introduce a financial crisis dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 during the 
crisis quarter 2007Q3 through 2008Q4 and zero otherwise. During the financial crisis 
Huerta et al. (2011) suggest that anxiety, fear and panic were prevalent emotions among 
investors which arguably contributed to the stock market volatility. During this period 
there was also heighten uncertainty with regards to the quality of bank balance sheets due 
to heavy exposures fueled by aggressive subprime lending activity. A priori we would 
expect that the financial crisis would have unfavorable impacts on charter value given the 
imbedded risks on bank balance sheet and on off-balance vehicles that had accumulated 
during the economic expansion period led by housing boom period. Therefore, we expect 
a negative relationship between the crisis indicator variable and Tobin’s Q.   
     Second, we allow for the interaction between trading derivative incomes and dealer 
designation. We wish to examine whether the impact of trading income on charter value 
operates through the derivative dealer designation. A priori, if derivative dealers enjoy a 
monopolistic advantage in this market, we would expect that the impact on charter value 
would be favorable under the premise that trading incomes represent an important 
contribution to overall BHC incomes. Under this line of reasoning we would expect a 
positive relationship between trading income and Tobin’s Q when trading income is 
interacted with the dealer designation indicator variable. 
6. Results 
 
6.1 Panel Data Regression Analysis 
In Table 4 we report the results of our fixed effects panel estimations for the 
benchmark mark (Model 1) and the two alternative specifications (Models 2 and 3). In 
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Model 2 we control for the potential  impact of the financial crisis on BHC charter value 
through a dummy variable “crisis” (1 for the period between 2007Q3 and 2008Q4, and 0 
otherwise) and in Model 3 we include an interaction term between trading income and 
dealer designation. The coefficients of the trading derivatives income variable, the 
primary variable of interest in this study, are negative in all models ranging from -0.162  
in Model 1 to -0.542 in Model 3, yet statistically significant only in Model 3. These  
results can be linked to the study by Li and Yu’s (2010) who find that trading incomes 
have no impact on BHC ROA while having a significant and positive correlation with the 
volatility of asset values. Trading’s income impact on asset volatility and its null impact 
on ROA would suggest a negative impact, if any, on BHC charter value. Neither trading 
derivatives nor non-trading derivatives holdings have a statistically significant impact on 
BHC charter value. This result suggest that the risk reducing attributes of derivative 
activity may be subdued  by un-hedged BHC risk attributes and other balance sheet 
uncertainties at minimum with regards to our sample and sample time frame. 
Furthermore, to the extent that trading derivatives are assets that belong to customers, 
there would be no risk taken by the BHC under this premise which would imply a non-
impact on charter value. 
The positive and significant impact of net interest income on BHC charter value in all 
three models is consistent with empirical findings in the BHC charter literature. The 
coefficients range from 0.362 in Model 3 to 0.374 in Model 2, and are significant at the 
5% level, suggesting that this source of operational market power leads to improved BHC 
charter value. The results support the view that BHCs retain a form pricing power that 
allows them to set loan yields at above market rates will attracting funds, mainly insured 
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demand deposits, at below-market rates. The coefficients on the core-deposit variable are 
negative and modestly significant at the 10% level in all three models ranging from -
0.182 in Model 3 to -0.198 in Model 2. This result is inconsistent with theory yet it is not 
surprising given the trend that we observe in the Tobin’s Q and core-deposit series 
graphed in Figures 5 and 6 respectively. There has been a general downward trend in 
Tobin’s Q over the sample period while bank core-deposits, a common measure of 
market power, have been on the rise. Jones et al. (2011) conclude that BHC charter value, 
proxied by Tobin’s Q, has been on the decline given the increase risk-taking by banks 
that led to the subprime financial crisis. Cornett et al. (2011) suggest that during the 
financial crisis period funds were leaving the securities market and flowing into the 
banking system with most of these funds going into transaction deposits. While a rise in 
core deposits implies an increase in market power that ceteris paribus should translate to 
an improved charter value, the Tobin’s Q and Core Deposit series depicted in Figures 5 
and 6 suggest that there may be other forces that are unrelated to market power that are 
driving the results. 
 While the BHC total assets, efficiency and real estate variables are of the expected 
sign, only the BHC total asset variable are statistically significant in all three 
specifications ranging from -0.127  in Model 1  to -0.124 in Models 2 and 3. The negative 
and significant coefficient on the BHC total asset variable supports the view that there are 
diseconomies of scale such as those related to technology investments that the larger 
banks are commonly exposed. Alternatively the negative coefficients may also signal 




The coefficients on the GDP and interest rate variables are of the expected sign yet 
only significant in the case of the GDP variable ranging from 1.498 in Model 3 to 1.617 
in Model 1. The positive and significant effect of the GDP variable suggests that the 
business cycles influence BHC charter value. It is common for BHC to enjoy higher 
profits during business cycle booms that are accompanied by an economic environment 
that exhibits strong loan demand and high credit quality. Conversely, BHC charter values 
would be expected to diminish if BHCs record falling profits during periods of economic 
contraction.  Interestingly, the coefficients on the S&P 500 variable are negative yet 
statistically insignificant in all 3 models ranging from -0.020 in Model 1 to -0.026 in 
Model 2. This result, while not statistically significant, is at odds with the findings by 
Jones et al. (2011) who claim that Tobin’s Q measures of charter value are heavily 
influenced by price-earnings ratios and overall stock market performance. These authors 
contend that if markets fail to adequately discount assets to account for their imbedded 
risk, Tobin’s Q would remain high during periods when the high-risk assets are 
generating strong profits. Eventually Tobin’s Q would be adjusted downward once the 
risk become apparent and the market value of the assets adjust accordingly. The small 
negative, coefficients on the S&P variable are not entirely surprising given the trend that 
we observe in the Tobin’s Q and S&P 500 series graphed in Figures 5 and 7 respectively. 
While Tobin’s Q series reflects downward trends  given the events (and resulting 
outcomes) that negatively impacted the banking industry (i.e. balance uncertainty, 
excessive risk taking, subprime lending, losses and increasing leverage, among others), 
the returns on the S&P 500 index, that captures multiple industries, reflects a volatile yet  
fairly flat trend over the sample period.   
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To the extent that the financial crisis had any impact on BHC charter value we would 
presume that its effect would be negative. During the financial crisis period BHCs were 
highly concerned about balance sheet valuations (as well as those of their competitors). 
Furthermore, they were exposed to significant liquidity constraints and overall financial 
market disruption. The coefficients on the financial crisis dummy variable are negative 
yet not significant. The positive and significant coefficient in the interaction term 
between trading income and dealer designation included in Model 3 is an interesting 
result. The implication is that dealer banks (as opposed to non-dealer banks) are well 
equipped to adequately manage risk and are able to benefit from profitable trading 
activities that favorably impact BHC charter value.  
6.2 Quartile Ranking Analysis 
 Some researchers including Jones et al. (2011) suggest that the cardinal properties of 
Tobin’s Q as a proxy for charter value are inadequate since Tobin’s Q values are largely 
influenced by external factors such as price earnings ratios and overall stock market 
conditions that are not necessarily connected to market power. Furthermore, while charter 
value is typically viewed as a long-term slow-moving financial investment concept that is 
based on a firm’s ability to generate ongoing economic profits, Tobin’s Q values reflect 
large swings in unison with changes in the business cycle. Based on this line of 
reasoning, Tobin’s Q is arguably a poor cardinal measure of charter value (i.e. Tobin’s Q 
is unable to adequately measure the amount of change in the magnitude of charter 
value).To mitigate this issue, we reexamine our research questions relying on the ordinal 
properties of Tobin’s Q in a similar fashion that was employed by Jones et al. (2011).   
     Under the view that Tobin’s Q has adequate ordinal properties, at any given point in 
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time those BHCs that have the higher Tobin’s Q values (compared to the BHC’s with the 
lower Tobin’s Q values) may have the stronger incentive to refrain from risk-taking 
under the assumption that BHC wish to preserve the economic benefits that are realizable 
through the granting of the charter. Jones et al. (2011) explain that in an effort to retain 
their competitive advantage, BHC take on less risk by holding more capital as their 
charter value increases.  Before hand, we would anticipated that BHCs with higher 
charter values upon entering the crisis period should perform better compared to their 
counterparts under the premise that charter preservation matters. 
      To conduct our analysis based on the ordinal properties of Tobin’s Q we first 
categorize the Tobin’s Q values as of 2006Q4 for the BHC in the sample into quartiles 
with the first quartile comprised of the BHC with the lowest Tobin’s Q value with the 4
th
 
quartile consisting of BHC’s with the highest Tobin’s Q values. Next, we compute the 
mean values for the risk variable (Tier 1 Capital Ratio) along with the mean values for 
the efficiency and trading derivative variables by quartile. We also compute the mean 
values of the changes in the referenced variables between 2006Q4 and 2008Q4 by 
quartile. If Tobin’s Q is useful measure of BHC charter value then we should see a 
negative correlation between Tobin’s Q in 2006Q4 and the level of (and changes in) risk 
at 2008Q4 if preservation of charter value is relevant.  
  Panel A in Table 5 suggests that BHC with the highest Tobin’s Q values had the 
stronger balance sheets as evidenced by the Tier 1 capital ratios as of 2008Q4 compared 
to capital ratios of the BHCs that reported the lowest levels of Tobin’s Q. The difference 
in the Tier 1 capital ratios between these two groups however is statistically insignificant 
(p-value of 0.910). While the BHCs with the highest Tobin’s Q value at 2006Q4 also 
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reported better efficiency measures in 2008Q4 compared to the BHC’s in the lowest 
quartile (0.672 vs.0.790 ), the difference between the groups was not statistically 
significant. BHC’s with the highest Tobin’s Q values at 2006Q4, reflected lower levels of 
trading derivative positions as of 2008Q4, which would imply some form of risk 
aversion, yet this group of BHCs outperformed their peers that are ranked with the lowest 
Tobin’s Q values in terms of trading incomes. Similar conclusions are reached in 
examining Panel B of Table 5 in terms of changes in the variable values between 2006Q4 
and 2008Q4 yet again the group differences were statistically insignificant. Some  
interesting, albeit not statistically significant, observations in Panel B of Table 5 is that 
the BHC’s with the lowest Tobin’s Q values reduced their exposures to trading 
derivatives while the  highest Tobin’s Q group of BHCs reported a small increase in 
trading derivatives yet with virtually no change in trading derivative incomes between 
2006Q4 and 2008Q4. 
During the height of the financial crisis period 2007Q3 to 2008Q4, all but four BHCs 
(i.e. State Street Corporation, Wells Fargo & Co, Key Corporation and Regions  
Financial Corporation), reported cumulative trading losses. The pre-crisis charter value, 
proxied by Tobin’s Q as of 2006Q4 for these four BHC’s reflected no discernible pattern.   
State Street and Wells Fargo are ranked in the highest Tobin’s Q quartile while Key 
Corporation and Regions Financial Corporation are ranked in the second lowest and the 
lowest quartiles respectively. The largest trading losses were reported by derivative 
dealer BHCs Citigroup and Bank of America Corporation whose Tobin’s Q ranked in the 
lower quartiles (i.e. weaker BHC charter values). While there are large differences in 
asset size and core deposit holdings between dealer and non dealer BHCs, dealer BHC 
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witness growth in quarterly trading revenues during the sample period while non-dealer 
BHCs reported a contraction in quarterly trading income activity.  
We conduct robustness checks that are presented in Models 1 through 3 in Table 6.  
As an initial attempt to capture the potential dynamic interactions between bank charter 
value (proxied by Tobin’s Q) and its determinants (the right hand side variables in our 
model) as well as the persistence in the Tobin’s Q series, we allow for a lag value of 
Tobin’s Q to enter our fixed effects specification in Model 1. The findings are generally 
consistent with our expectations in that trading derivative incomes do not favorably 
impact bank charter value based on the statistically insignificant coefficient of -0.017 in 
Model 1. On the other hand we do not find evidence of a positive relationship between 
trading derivative incomes by dealer banks and bank charter value. We reach similar 
conclusions in Model 2 in which we replace the current trading derivative income with a 
lag of itself. 
In Model 3 we explore an alternative proxy of bank charter value that is defined as 
the ratio of core deposits to BHC total deposits, a proxy that was introduced by Jones et 
al. (2011). Interestingly, we find that trading derivative incomes have a positive impact 
on bank charter value based on the statistically significant coefficient of 0.885 while the 
interaction between trading derivative incomes and dealer banks has a negative impact 
based on the statistically significant coefficient of -0.985 reported in Model 3. The 
findings in Model 3 that at first glance seem to be at odds with our hypotheses are not 
necessarily surprising. A visual inspection of Figures 3 and 4 which depict the Tobin’s Q 
and the core deposit series respectively show two opposing patterns. For a greater part of 
the time span covered, Tobin’s Q has been in a general downward trend in part due to the 
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increase risk-taking activities by banks that led to the financial crisis while since the latter 
part of 2007 bank core deposit have sharply increased. The banks received a significant 
influx of liquidity through Federal Reserve Bank expansion activity (multiple rounds of 
quantitative easing) and as a result of a massive restructure of the financial sector balance 
sheets. The inconsistency in the findings based on the use of different proxies of bank 
charter value (i.e. Tobin’s Q vs. core deposits) lends support to the general conclusion by 
Jones et al. (2011) regarding the reliability of Tobin’s Q as key measure of charter value.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 This paper examines the relationship between derivative trading income and charter 
value for 27 bank holding companies (BHC) between 2001Q1 and 2011Q3. This paper is 
motivated by the continued evolution in derivative securities, and the significant trading 
losses recorded during the 2007-2009 financial crises, that have drawn attention to bank 
regulators, law makers and the investor public. There are some researchers who contend 
that off-balance-activities, including derivatives trading, have become a potential source 
of bank charter value for the large banks. To the extent that derivatives reduce balance 
risk (used for hedging purposes) and represent a monopoly source of income (used for 
trading/profit purposes) we would expect that derivatives would exert a positive impact 
on charter value as proxied by Tobin’s Q. 
The findings in this paper suggests that trading incomes have a negative impact on 
BHC charter value suggesting that derivative activity is driven more by profit as opposed 
to hedging motives. This finding implies that BHCs increase risk through their off-
balance sheet activities that generate volatile trading revenues. We also find that while 
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that trading income has a negative impact on BHC charter value, the impact becomes 
positive when trading income is interacted with derivative dealer designation. This 
finding implies that dealer banks (as opposed to non-dealer banks) are well equipped to 
adequately manage risk and are able to benefit from profitable trading activities that 
favorably impact BHC charter value.  In any event, trading income’s contribution to BHC 
charter value is most likely damped by the fact that trading income is only a small 
fraction of BHCs’ net operating revenue and is highly volatile. On this basis, we are 
inclined to believe that any contribution of trading incomes to BHC charter value may be 
suspect at best.  Finally, we observe that trading income did not contribute to overall 
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Figure 1 Derivative Contracts Market-Herfindahl index 
 
Notes: The Herfindahl Index is computed from the reported notional amounts of derivative contracts outstanding for 
each of the top 25 commercial banks, savings and loans associations (S&Ls) and trust companies (TCs) along with 
aggregate notional amounts for the remaining commercial banks, S&L’s and  TC’s that engage in derivative activity. 
The information is extracted from the quarterly reports of derivative activities that are available through the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury’s Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) at the following website 
(http://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/derivatives-quarterly-























































































































































































































Figure 2 Derivative and total asset growth 
 
Notes: The dashed line identified as “sample derivatives” represents the sum of total trading derivatives held by the 
27 bank holding companies (BHC) in our sample. The solid line identified as “sample assets” constitutes the sum of   
total assets held by the 27 BHCs in the sample. Both series cover the sample period from 2001Q1to2011Q3. The 
solid line identified as “overall derivatives” captures the total notional amount of derivative contracts outstanding for 
each of the top 25 commercial banks, savings and loans associations (S&Ls) and trust companies (TCs) along with 
aggregate notional amounts  for the remaining commercial banks, S&L’s and  TC’s that engage in derivative 
activity. The dash dotted dash line identified as “overall assets” represents the sum of the total assets of those 
commercial banks, S&L’s and TC that are engaged in derivative activity and that correspond to the institutions 
included in the “overall derivative” series. The “overall assets” and “overall derivative” series cover the period from 
1998Q4 to 2012Q4. The information for the “overall derivative” and “overall asset” series are extracted from the 
quarterly reports of derivative activities that are available through the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) at the following website (http://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-


























































































































































































































Overall Assets (Tril US $) Overall Derivatives (Tril US $)
Sample Assets (Tril US $) Sample Derivatives (Tril US $)
37 
 
Figure 3 Trading revenues scaled by net interest and non interest income 
 
Notes: These series represent asset weighted mean trading revenues scaled by the sum of net interest income and 
non-interest income for the 27 bank holding companies (BHC) in the sample. The series cover the full sample 





















































































































Figure 4 Trading revenues of U.S. Commercial Banks  
 
Notes: These series represent quarterly trading revenues from cash and derivative activities by insured U.S. 
commercial banks. Revenue figures are quarterly data as opposed to cumulative data.  The information is extracted 
from the quarterly reports of derivative activities that are available through the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) at the following website (http://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-


























































































































































































































































Figure 5 Tobin’s Q Trend 
 
Notes: The series represents the mean Tobin’s Q for the 27 bank holding companies (BHC) in the sample. The 
Tobin’s Q measure is calculated on a quarterly basis and consists of the ratio of the sum of the market value of 
equity plus the book value of total BHC liabilities divided by BHC total assets. The quarterly market value of 
equity is derived from the monthly market capitalization data for each of the BHCs that are available through the 
Bloomberg data base (http://bloomberg.com). The BHCs total liabilities and assets information is extracted from 
quarterly call reports that are available through the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago data base at the following 
website: https://www.chicagofed.org/applications/bhc_data/bhcdata_index.cfm.  The series cover the full sample 




































































































Figure 6 Core Deposit Trend 
 
Notes: The series represents the mean core deposits scaled by BHC total liabilities for the 27 bank holding 
companies (BHC) in the sample. Core deposits include the sum of non-interest bearing and interest bearing demand 
deposits, money market and savings accounts plus time deposits < U.S. $100,000. The series cover the full sample 









































































































Figure 7 S&P 500 index returns 
 
 Notes: The series represents the Standard & Poors (S&P) 500 inflation-adjusted returns on the index. 
 The S&P 500 index returns series is derived from data that is available through Thomson Reuter’s Datastream.  










































































































































Full sample- Panel A 
mean 260,639,045 1.90% 326.44% 3.09% 34.84% 63.10% 54.94% 20.85% 
median 64,733,769 1.75% 19.38% 1.32% 34.18% 61.01% 61.03% 12.73% 
Std. Dev. 508,518,644 1.02% 875.94% 6.07% 14.84% 19.41% 21.20% 27.15% 
Min 6,239,843 0.21% 0.00% -49.73% 0.00% 39.44% 0.86% 0.00% 
Max 2,370,594,235 6.30% 5704.55% 40.52% 63.56% 517.91% 91.20% 242.93% 
         Derivatives dealer- Panel B 
mean 722,675,006 1.63% 1064.53% 4.47% 24.50% 64.44% 41.14% 32.25% 
median 341,754,500 1.50% 292.13% 2.91% 26.56% 61.56% 49.33% 17.89% 
Std. Dev. 734,147,890 0.93% 1364.41% 7.55% 14.85% 11.89% 23.71% 37.99% 
Min 66,409,507 0.21% 11.60% -49.73% 0.00% 45.71% 0.86% 0.21% 
Max 2,370,594,235 4.54% 5704.55% 25.66% 53.04% 159.74% 77.81% 242.39% 
         Non dealer- Panel C 
mean 58,662,393 2.01% 22.74% 2.49% 39.34% 62.51% 60.94% 15.89% 
median 32,753,772 1.92% 4.71% 0.86% 40.04% 60.66% 63.18% 9.38% 
Std. Dev. 60,858,544 1.04% 44.20% 5.19% 12.39% 21.88% 16.80% 18.71% 
Min 6,239,843 0.25% 0.00% -10.51% 0.07% 39.44% 1.97% 0.00% 
Max 330,141,000 6.30% 287.78% 40.52% 63.56% 517.91% 91.20% 132.16% 
 
Notes:  Total assets are expressed in levels and in thousands of dollars while all other bank variables are expressed in ratio form. The descriptive detail is 
computed for the entire sample period from 2001Q1 to 2011Q3. The data is extracted from Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (call 
report form FR-Y- 9C) that are submitted on a quarterly basis to the Federal Reserve. The data is available through the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago data 
base at the following website https://www.chicagofed.org/applications/bhc_data/bhcdata_index.cfm last accessed on 9/20/12. The full sample includes 27 bank 
holding companies (BHC). Dealer banks include: JP Morgan Chase & Co, Bank of America Corporation, Citigroup, Wellsfargo & Co., State Street Corporation, 
Regions Financial Corp, PNC Financial Services Group Inc and Key Corp. For the full list of sample banks refer to Appendix A. Author’s calculations.  
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Table 2. Sample BHC size, asset growth, capitalization, trading revenue and derivative growth 
 
 





Tier 1 risk based 










Full sample- Panel A 
mean 380,561,576 1.69% 13.004 -62.58% 1995.00% 
median 92,751,923 1.29% 12.840 0.00% 0.00% 
Std. Dev. 699,837,914 5.03% 1.84 2127.52% 66092.37% 
Min 13,475,572 -38.39% 10.320 -69060.29% -100.00% 
Max 2,289,240,000 48.53% 17.870 6440.51% 2200000.00% 
      
Derivatives dealer- Panel B 
mean 1,055,932,717 1.76% 13.206 22.33% 4.58% 
median 787,250,233 1.39% 12.980 -5.69% 3.03% 
Std. Dev. 988,981,195 5.80% 2.068 448.65% 14.43% 
Min 89,405,605 -38.39% 11.260 -1331.17% -31.55% 
Max 2,289,240,000 39.21% 17.870 6440.51% 156.83% 
      
Non dealer- Panel C 
mean 78,174,644 1.67% 12.919 -97.63% 2803.29% 
median 38,179,000 1.28% 12.560 0.00% 0.00% 
Std. Dev. 84,537,353 4.68% 1.789 2510.63% 78371.42% 
Min 13,475,572 -13.84% 10.320 -69060.29% -100.00% 
Max 330,141,000 48.53% 16.100 4300.00% 2200000.00% 
 
Notes:  Total assets are expressed in thousands of dollars while the bank tier 1 risk capital measure is in ratio form. Quarterly assets and trading  
derivatives growth rates are based on a simple computation: {(value present quarter- value prior quarter)/value prior quarter}. The quarterly 





























BHC Total Assets 1.0000
Net Interest Income-std -0.1283 1.0000
Trading Deriv-std 0.6670 -0.2065 1.0000
Trading Deriv Income-std 0.1423 -0.2208 0.3095 1.0000
R/E loans-std -0.0275 0.0287 -0.0135 -0.0414 1.0000
Efficiency -0.0352 -0.1094 0.0283 0.0297 0.0068 1.0000
GDP % GAP -0.0315 -0.0170 0.0022 0.0825 0.0081 -0.1247 1.0000
S&P 500 index ret 0.0176 -0.0939 0.0143 0.0884 -0.0317 -0.0368 0.6688 1.0000
TB3MOS -0.0125 -0.0625 -0.0003 0.0803 0.0675 -0.0065 0.4829 0.3506 1.0000
Core Deposits-std 0.0069 0.1098 -0.0105 -0.0030 0.1538 0.0979 -0.1493 -0.0610 0.0048 1.0000
Non Trading Deriv-std 0.3428 0.1003 0.0200 0.1085 0.0402 -0.0190 0.0247 -0.0111 0.0089 -0.0218 1.0000
Crisis 0.0592 0.0553 0.0145 -0.1721 -0.0327 -0.0015 -0.4399 -0.3731 -0.5272 -0.0201 -0.0316 1.0000
Dealer 0.7086 -0.1714 0.5384 0.1417 -0.0268 0.0439 -0.0012 0.0022 0.0000 -0.0217 0.2847 0.0043 1.0000





















Notes:  BHC total assets enter in log form. The net interest income variable is scaled by BHC average quarterly assets. Trading derivatives (Trading Deriv) 
includes the sum of the gross notional values of interest rate, foreign exchange, equity and commodity derivatives held for trading scaled by BHC assets. Trading 
derivative income (Trading Deriv Income) is scaled by the sum of net interest and non-interest income. Real estate loans (R/E loans) are scaled by BHC assets 
and expressed in first difference. Efficiency is measured as the ratio of bank overhead to the sum of net interest and non-interest income. The GDP% GAP is the  
percentage difference between actual and potential GDP and is expressed in first difference. The S&P500 is the inflation-adjusted returns on the Standard & 
Poors 500 index. The TB3MOS is the first difference of the 3-month Treasury bill market rate. Core-Deposits are the first difference of the ratio of core deposits 
to total BHC liabilities. Core deposits include the sum of non-interest bearing and interest bearing demand deposits, money market and savings accounts plus 
time deposits < $100,000.Non trading derivatives (NonTrading Deriv) include the sum of the gross notional values of interest rate, foreign exchange, equity and 
commodity derivatives held for purposes other than trading scaled by BHC assets. Dealer is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dealer banks and zero 




Table 4. Fixed effects panel models for assessing the impact of trading derivative income on 
BHC charter value 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Independent variables 
    
Constant 3.398*** 3.360*** 3.374*** 
 
 
(0.319) (0.298) (0.302) 
 
BHC Total Assets -0.127*** -0.124*** -0.124*** 
 
 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
 
Net Interest  Income-std  0.366** 0.374** 0.362** 
 
 
(0.142) (0.148) (0.147) 
 
 Trading Deriv -std -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
 Trading Deriv Income-std -0.162 -0.172 -0.542*** 
 
 
(0.103) (0.109) (0.134) 
 
R/E loans-std 0.274 0.276 0.278 
 
 
(0.190) (0.192) (0.192) 
 
Efficiency -0.057 -0.057 -0.055 
 
 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.034) 
 
GDP % Gap 1.617*** 1.581*** 1.498*** 
 
 
(0.277) (0.254) (0.250) 
 
S&P 500 ret -0.020 -0.026 -0.023 
 
 
(0.019) (0.024) (0.023)  
TB3MO -0.012 -0.016* -0.017** 
 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
Coredep-std -0.192* -0.198* -0.182* 
 
 
(0.095) (0.098) (0.090) 
 
 Non-Trading Deriv -std 0.010  0.009  0.001  
 
 













   
(0.129) 
Bank Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Time dummies No No No 
 
Cross sections (BHC) 27 27 27 
 
Within  R2 0.4534 0.4543 0.4694 
 Notes: The dependent variable Tobin’s Q and all other variables enter the model in quarterly frequency. Refer to 
Table 3 for a detailed description of the variables employed in the model. We employ Hausman Tests to determine 
whether fixed or random effects are the appropriate specification. The statistic is Chi-square distributed. The null 
hypothesis of the test is that the coefficients estimated by random effects estimator are the same as the ones 
estimated by the fixed effects estimator. Significant P-values support fixed effects estimation. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parenthesis. The symbols *, ** and *** refer to levels of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%. There are 





Table 5. Charter value quartile and changes in key bank variables 
 
Panel A Variable levels at 2008Q4 
Tobin’s Q quartiles 








     1st- lowest 12.246 0.790 5.345 0.008 
2nd 10.604 0.774 5.470 -0.082 
3rd  10.921 0.608 0.306 0.012 
4th-highest 12.462 0.672 1.483 0.045 
Q4-Q1 0.216 -0.118 -3.861 0.037 
P-values 0.910 0.461 0.489 0.425 
     
Panel B Change in variable between 2006Q4 and 2008Q4 
 
 








1st- lowest 2.186 0.142 -1.173 -0.029 
2nd 2.158 0.190 0.755 -0.110 
3rd  0.997 0.051 -0.172 -0.002 
4th-highest 2.345 0.054 0.311 0.006 
Q4-Q1 0.159 -0.087 1.483 0.036 
P-values 0.909 0.584 0.303 0.475 
 
Notes: BHC have been divided into quartiles based on 2006Q4 computed Tobin’s Q values. For 
each quartile the mean values of each of the four variables identified above are computed as of 
2008Q4 and reported in Panel A. Mean changes in the variables between 2006Q4 and 2008Q4 are 
 computed and reported in Panel B. We test for the differences in means (assuming unequal group 
 variances) between the lowest and highest quartiles. P-values based on two tail test. The null hypothesis 




Table 6. Robustness checks for fixed effects panel models 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Independent variables 
    Constant 0.424*** 3.358*** -0.147 
 
 
(0.055) (0.298) (0.668) 
 Tobin’s Q (1-lag) 0.897*** 
   
 
(0.016) 
   BHC Total Assets -0.017*** -0.125*** 0.048 
 
 
(0.003) (0.016) (0.038) 
 Net Interest  Income-std  -0.020 0.416** 0.418** 
 
 
(0.057) (0.159) (0.178) 
 Trading Deriv -std -0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 














  R/E loans-std -0.047 0.288 -0.107 
 
 
(0.062) (0.198) (0.154) 
 Efficiency -0.002 -0.053 0.034 
 
 
(0.003) (0.033) (0.029) 
 GDP % Gap 0.330*** 1.755*** 0.821** 
 
 
(0.118) (0.297) (0.394) 
 S&P 500 ret 0.072*** -0.033 -0.061 
 
 
(0.010) (0.026) (0.040) 
 
TB3MO -0.008** -0.019** -0.010 
 
 
(0.003) (0.009) (0.015) 




  Non-Trading Deriv –std 0.003  0.011  -0.094  
 
 
(0.003) (0.029) (0.081) 
 Crisis -0.008*** -0.004 -0.051*** 
 
 
(0.002) (0.008) (0.017) 
 Trading Deriv Income-std* Dealer        0.003           0.050 -0.985*** 
 
 
(0.022) (0.096) (0.347) 
Bank Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
 Time dummies No No No 
 Cross sections (BHC) 27 27 27 
 Within  R
2 0.9316 0.4502 0.1283 
  Notes: The dependent variable Tobin’s Q in Models 1and 2 is defined as the ratio of the sum of the market value of 
equity plus the book value of total liabilities to bank holding company (BHC) total assets. The dependent variable in 
Model 3 is the ratio of core deposits to BHC total deposits.  All variables enter the model in quarterly frequency. 
Refer to Table 3 for a detailed description of the independent variables employed in the models. We employ 
Hausman Tests to determine whether fixed or random effects are the appropriate specification. The statistic is Chi-
square distributed. The null hypothesis of the test is that the coefficients estimated by random effects estimator are 
the same as the ones estimated by the fixed effects estimator. Significant P-values support fixed effects estimation. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The symbols *, ** and *** refer to levels of significance of 10%, 




Appendix A. List of Sample Bank Holding Companies (BHC). 
 












Wells Fargo & Co 1120754 WFC 1,304,945,000 3,777,483,000 
US Bancorp 1119794 USB 330,141,000 111,115,000 
SunTrust Banks Inc 1131787 STI 172,583,676 300,898,148 
Capital One Financial Corp 2277860 COF 200,148,496 72,031,010 
KeyCorp 1068025 KEY 89,405,605 68,803,519 
Commerica Incorporated 1199844 CMA 60,991,256 17,920,010 
First Horizon National Corporation 1094640 FHN 25,572,194 21,950,513 
Citigroup 1951350 C 1,935,992,000 51,712,103,000 
JP Morgan Chase & Co 1039502 JPM 2,289,240,000 69,996,484,000 
Associated Banc-Corp 1199563 ASBC 21,902,649 4,304,552 
BB& T Corporation 1074156 BBT 167,676,889 67,415,207 
BOK Financial Corporation 1883693 BOKF 24,989,313 32,493,783 
Commerce Bancshares Inc 1049341 CBSH 20,651,278 644,172 
City National Corporation 1027518 CYN 23,104,260 1,859,887 
Bank of America Corporation 1073757 BAC 2,221,386,576 69,785,686,360 
First BanCorp 2744894 FBP 13,475,572 292,871 
First Citizens BancShares Inc 1075612 FCNCA 21,015,345 265,933 
Fifth Third Bancorp 1070345 FITB 114,904,741 74,345,825 
Huntington Bancshares Inc 1068191 HBAN 54,978,707 24,011,292 
Northern Trust Co 1199611 NTRS 96,098,241 264,816,885 
PNC Financial Services Group Inc 1069778 PNC 269,555,466 372,015,262 
Regions Financial Corp 3242838 RF 129,761,507 157,966,651 
Synovus Financial  Corporation 1078846 SNV 28,253,924 2,055,552 
State Street Corporation 1111435 STT 207,175,585 1,469,172,135 
Zions Bancorporation 1027004 ZION 51,531,600 6,641,391 
TCF Financial Corporation 2389941 TCB 19,120,101 176,541 





Appendix B. BHC Variables and Code Names 
 
Schedule Variable name Code 
HI- Consolidated Income statement Net interest income BHCK 4074 
""                  ""                   "" Total noninterest income BHCK 4079 
""                  ""                   "" Total noninterest expense (bank overhead) BHCK 4093 
 
Trading Revenue BHCK A220 
HC- Consolidated Balance Sheet Total assets BHCK 2170 
""                  ""                   "" Total liabilities BHCK 2948 
HC- C- Loans & Leases Financing Receivables Loans secured by real estate BHCK 1410 
""                  ""                   "" Total loans BHCK 2122 
HC- E- Deposit Liabilities Interest bearing demand deposits BHCB 3187 
""                  ""                   "" Non-interest bearing deposits BHCB 2210 
""                  ""                   "" MMD & other savings accounts BHCB 2389 
""                  ""                   "" Time deposits <$100,000 BHCB 6648 
HC-K- Quarterly Averages Total assets BHCK 3368 
HC- L- Derivatives and Off Balance Sheet Items Gross notional interest rate derivatives held for trading BHCKA126 
""                  ""                   "" Gross notional foreign exchange derivatives held for trading BHCKA127 
""                  ""                   "" Gross notional equity derivatives held for trading BHCK 8723 
""                  ""                   "" Gross notional commodity derivatives held for trading BHCK 8724 
""                  ""                   "" Gross notional interest rate derivatives non-trading BHCK 8725 
""                  ""                   "" Gross notional foreign exchange derivatives non-trading BHCK 8726 
""                  ""                   "" Gross notional equity derivatives non-trading BHCK 8727 
""                  ""                   "" Gross notional commodity derivatives non-trading BHCK 8728 
HC- R- Regulatory Capital Tier 1 risk based capital ratio BHCK 7206 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago website 
https://www.chicagofed.org/applications/bhc_data/bhcdata_index.cfm last accessed on 9/20/12. 
 
 
